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Enforcement of EU Environmental Law: 
Taking stock of the evolving Union 
legal framework 
Martin Hedemann-Robinson1  
 
I  Introduction 
 
Over 40 years have now passed since the European Union first launched its initial policy 
programme2 on the environment and close to 30 years since the environment was first 
officially recognised as a constituent component of the UnionÕs constitutional framework by 
virtue of the Single European Act 1986.3  Since then, the EUÕs common environmental policy 
has come to establish itself as a major element of the UnionÕs political mandate as reflected 
notably in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as Articles 191-193 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Specifically, Article 3(3) TEU requires the 
Union to fashion the internal market consonant with Ôthe sustainable development of EuropeÕ 
and based on inter alia Ôa high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environmentÕ. Article 191 TFEU anchors the UnionÕs environmental policy to the principles 
of precaution, preventive action, proximity and polluter pays. These legal foundations have 
paved the way for the adoption of some 200 pieces of EU legislation across a wide range of 
environmental topic areas, including notably in relation to the water, waste, air quality, 
climate change, nature and chemicals management sectors. The European Commission has 
assessed that these measures constitute the bedrock of much of the national environmental 
policies of the EU-28 member states, estimating that some 80% of environmental laws 
adopted at the national level in the Union are based upon EU environmental legislation.4 
Moreover, Article 11 TFEU, the so-called integration principle, stipulates that environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Union 
policies and activities. Accordingly, environmental protection needs are, as a matter of EU 
constitutional law, required to be internalised within the development of EU policies across 
																																																													
1 Senior Lecturer in Law, Kent University Law School, UK. This article is based on a paper presented at a 
conference held at UCL on Effective Environmental Enforcement on 30-31.3.2015, a special symposium to mark 
Professor Richard MacroryÕs contribution to the development of environmental law.		
2 The first environment action programme of the (then) European Economic Community was adopted in 
November 1973 (OJ 1973 C112/1). 
3 OJ 1987 L169. The SEA established the legal framework for the development of a European Community 
environmental policy by incorporating Title VII (Arts.130r-t) within the former European Economic 
Community Treaty (as subsequently superseded by the TFEU).  
4 Environment Directorate General (DGENV), European Commission: Management Plan 2013  (14.1.2013) at 




the piece and not just within the specific parameters of the UnionÕs environmental policy. 
This principle has profound implications for the development of other Union policies that 
have direct or indirect impacts on the environment such as those in relation to the internal 
market, energy, transport, fisheries and agriculture, foreign affairs and fiscal matters.   
 
To what extent, though, are the environmental commitments entered into at EU level properly 
safeguarded?  At the heart of any environmental policy, whether adopted at national, regional 
or international level, lies the issue of enforcement. For unless an environmental policy 
instrument is duly applied and implemented as anticipated and required by the legislative 
decision-maker(s), its words are liable to remain but pious sentiments and aspirations on a 
statutory page. The difference between ÔgreenwashÕ and environmental law becomes 
negligible without proper law enforcement machinery being in place.  This challenge is all 
the more acute within the context of the EU, a supranational regional organisation with a 
mandate to craft a single market space, where trust and credibility in supranational decision-
making is prone to become undermined if the writ of Union law does not run effectively at 
national level across the constituent member states. Notably, poor and/or patchy levels of law 
enforcement impair the delivery of agreed common high environmental standards as well as 
fragment trading conditions and distort competition within the single market area.  
 
This article considers to what extent the Union has developed effective legal means to ensure 
that its wide range of environmental policy instruments are properly enforced, both at the 
national level of member states as well as at the EU institutional level. In addition to 
providing an overview of and critical reflections on the principal aspects of the UnionÕs 
developing legal framework concerning the enforcement of EU environmental law, it also 
focuses on a particular important emerging element of the UnionÕs enforcement architecture, 
namely the EUÕs policy concerning minimum environmental inspection requirements. Whilst 
it is apparent, as this article intends to highlight, that the Union has established and to some 
extent enhanced various legal instruments intended to assist in ensuring the due application of 
EU environmental norms, it is also clear that in many respects these legal tools have 
remained underdeveloped and of limited effectiveness. The issue of enforcement has not been 
treated at EU level with the degree of seriousness it deserves; for several years it could have 
been regarded as but a ÔCinderellaÕ component of EU environmental policy. However, as will 
be explored in this article, in more recent times there have been some significant moves to 
enhance the degree of EU involvement in this area.  
 
It is important to bear in mind from the outset in an analysis of this kind that under the 
UnionÕs constitutional framework5 specific powers and responsibilities have been set down 
for both EU institutions and member states regarding the issue law enforcement.  These 
provisions have been enshrined in the EUÕs treaty framework since its origins in the 1950s. 
As far as EU institutional level is concerned, both the European Commission as well as the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are charged with particular duties to oversee proper 
application of Union law by the member states. Specifically, the Commission is required 
under Article 17 TEU to Ôensure the application of the Treaties,6 and of measures adopted by 
the institutions pursuant to themÕ and Ôoversee the application of Union law under the control 
of the [CJEU]Õ. The principal mechanisms at the disposal of the Commission to ensure 
application of EU (environmental) law are the powers laid down in Articles 258 and 260 
TFEU enabling it to take legal action against defaulting member states (the so-called 
																																																													




infringement procedures).  Under Article 19 TEU the CJEU is vested with the task of 
ensuring that Ôin the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observedÕ [my 
emphasis]. By virtue of Article 4(3) TEU, which enshrines the principle of sincere co-
operation, the UnionÕs member states are inter alia required to Ôtake any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of obligations arising out of the Treaties or 
resulting from the acts of institutions of the UnionÕ.   By way of complement to the formal 
legal legitimacy underpinning development of Union measures to supervise member state 
implementation of EU obligations, it is evident that there is considerable popular support 
within the Union for this. As far as the environmental policy area is concerned, a recent 2014 
survey of EU public opinion carried out by the European Commission confirmed that 79% of 
EU citizens agree that the Union should be able to check that environmental laws are being 
correctly applied in the member states.7    
 
In his publicised mission letter8 of 1 November 2014 to Karmenu Vella (the newly appointed 
European Commissioner for the Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries) the European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker makes a rather bold and telling assertion. 
Specifically, he asserts that the ÔEU has a well-developed environmental policy with a rather 
complete and mature legal frameworkÕ.  On the surface it might appear that the PresidentÕs 
claim has some merit to it, taking into account in particular the range and depth of Union 
policy instrumentation developed and adopted to date in order to address substantive 
environmental protection issues. However, the Commission PresidentÕs appraisal is also 
rather misleading, at least as far as the area of EU environmental law enforcement is 
concerned.  As this article aims to show, a more realistic assessment would be that the 
UnionÕs legal framework in this area is still a structure in progress, rather fragile still and 
some way off from being in a position to have a genuinely effective impact. Prior to 
considering the various components of the EUÕs legal framework on enforcement of EU 
environmental law in turn, it is appropriate first to make some introductory general contextual 
remarks concerning the current state of implementation of EU environmental law in order to 
highlight the considerable gap that often exists between EU statutory requirements and the 
extent to which these are adhered to across the Union. 
 
 
1.1 State of implementation of EU environmental law 
It is apparent from the European CommissionÕs regular reports on compliance with Union 
law that there remain serious deficiencies in relation to the state of implementation of EU 
environmental legislation in the member states.  The UnionÕs environmental sector has stood 
out amongst EU policy sectors as having a persistently poor record in terms of member state 
compliance with EU legislative obligations. 
 
It is widely recognised that the state of implementation is poor across a broad range of 
environmental policy areas, including notably in the waste management, nature protection, 
water and air quality sectors. A 2009 study9 carried out by the EU association of 
environmental authorities IMPEL10 assessed that in the region of 19% of transboundary waste 
																																																													
7 Special Eurobarometer 416 Report on attitudes of European Citizens towards the environment (September 
2014) at Section VI.2.2. Available for inspection at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
8 Available for inspection at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vella_en 
9 ESWI Consortium (2009) IMPEL-TFS Enforcement Actions II Enforcement of EU waste Shipment 
Regulation ÒLearning by DoingÓ, Interim Project Report (12.10.2009). Available for inspection via IMPEL 
website: http://impel.eu 
10  EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law. 
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shipments in the Union were illegal.  In 2013 the European Commission published a report11 
confirming that some 14% of groundwater stations fail to meet minimum nitrate pollution 
standards stipulated by the EU Nitrates Directive.12 In 2014 the European Environment 
Agency assessed that in the region of 21%, 14 % and 8% of the EU-28 urban population 
resides in areas where the exposure to particular matter (PM10), ozone (O2) and nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) exceeds maximum EU limit values.13   In 2011 an environmental consultancy 
study commissioned for the EU estimated that the annual cost of non-implementation of the 
UnionÕs environmental acquis amounted to some €50bn.14  Most recently, in March 2015 
IMPEL has published a report15 signalling general concerns with the state of implementation 
of a wide range of EU environmental legislative instruments (notably in the water, waste, 
nature protection, air quality, agricultural and chemical sectors) by member states, noting in 
particular a general lack of resourcing, skills and capacity at the level of national authorities 
responsible for environmental regulation and enforcement as well as inadequate levels of 
sanctions to deal with persons breaching EU environmental requirements. 
 
 Over several years, the EU environmental policy sector has been subject to a large number of 
infringement actions taken by the European Commission against defaulting member states 
under Articles 258/260 TFEU. According to the CommissionÕs latest published data16 on 
environmental infringement casework, currently it is the EU policy sector with the second 
largest number of complaints from the public concerning non-compliance (14%),17 the largest 
number of open (ongoing) infringement cases pursued under Article 258 TFEU (26%)18 and 
with the largest number of second round infringement cases currently pursued by the 
Commission under Article 260 TFEU (35%).19  Moreover, as at the time of writing 45% of 
second round infringement rulings from the CJEU under Article 260 TFEU have concerned 
non-compliance with EU environmental law by member states.20  In 2014 the Commission 
																																																													
11 COM(2013)683 final, Commission Report on the Implementation of Council Directive 91/676/EEC 
concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources based on 
Member State reports for the period 2008Ð2011, 4.10.2013.  
12 Directive 91/676 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural 
sources (OJ 1991 L375/1). 
13 EEA Report No5/2014 Air quality in Europe Ñ 2014 report , 19.11.2014 (ISSN 1725-9177). Available for 
inspection at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/air-quality-in-europe-2014 
14 COWI The Costs of not implementing the environmental acquis (September 2011) - Final Report 
(ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073). Available for inspection at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/economics_policy/pdf/report_sept2011.pdf 
15 IMPEL Final Report: Challenges in the Practical Implementation of EU Environmental Law and how IMPEL 
could help overcome them, 23.3.2015. Available for inspection at: http://impel.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Implementation-Challenge-Report-23-March-2015.pdf 
16 As may be gleaned from the CommissionÕs Environment Directorate-GeneralÕs website on infringement 
statistics for 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm) as well as the CommissionÕs latest 
report  on EU law compliance (COM(2014)612 European Commission Annual Monitoring Report on the 
Application of EU law (2013), 1.10.2014) (http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-612-
EN-F1-1.Pdf). 
17  Namely, 520 out of 3,505 complaints registered in 2013 related to allegations of non-compliance with EU 
environmental law. (The sector with the highest number of complaints was justice and home affairs (16.8%)). 
18 Namely, 334 out of 1,300 open infringement cases related to suspected breaches of EU environmental law in 
2013. The EU policy sector with next largest number of infringement cases opened in 2013 was tax (13%). 
19 Specifically, 40 out of 113 ongoing second round infringement cases in 2013 concerned alleged failures by 
member states to adhere to judgments made by the CJEU under Art.258 TFEU declaring non-compliance with 
EU environmental law. 
20 Specifically, 11 out of a total of 24 second round infringement rulings decided by the CJEU: Case C-387/97 
Commission v Greece (Kouroupitos landfill) [1999] ECR I-3257; Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain (Bathing 
Waters) [2003] ECR I-14141; Case C-304/02 Commission v France (Fishing Controls) [2005] ECR I-6263; 
Case C-121/07 Commission v France (GMO Controls) [2008] ECR I-9195; Case C-279/11 Commission v 
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was pursuing 334 infringement actions against member states on account of non-compliance 
with EU environmental law. Whilst all member states were defendants in these open 
infringement cases, the member states with the highest number of legal proceedings being 
brought against them were Greece (36), Romania (30), Spain (30), Belgium (23), Poland 
(20), France (19), Italy (18) and the UK (16).  
 
As the above points indicate, there remains considerable room for improvement by member 
states in the way in which they take steps to fulfil their EU environmental obligations. The 




II Principal Components of the EUÕs Legal Framework on 
 Environmental Law Enforcement 
 
It is apparent that over a period of several years the Union has undertaken steps to develop a 
legal framework so as to assist in the task of and enhance law enforcement at national level. 
The emerging framework, which this section of the article will consider, can best be 
described as having three key components to it: 
 
¥ Infringement proceedings (Arts.258/260 TFEU). Specifically, these concern the 
particular legal proceedings that may be pursued by the European Commission 
against member states before the CJEU over statal failures to secure implementation 
of their EU environmental statutory obligations.  
 
¥ Civil society participation. Specifically, this component relates to the series of 
measures adopted by the Union in order to enhance rights of access to justice for 
private persons for the purpose of securing adherence to EU environmental law, 
primarily under the auspices of the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for 
EuropeÕs (UNECE) Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, concluded in rhus, 
Denmark (hereinafter referred to as the Ôrhus ConventionÕ).21 
 
¥ Competent authorities. This component covers the various initiatives undertaken by 
the EU with a view to assisting and enhancing the level of performance of national 
environmental authorities in policing the adherence to EU environmental 
requirements by the public and private sector. 
 
All the components are important and mutually supportive and strengthening as illustrated in 
Diagram 1 below. However, ultimately the third component (relating to the performance of 
competent environmental authorities) is the most significant as a source for delivering better 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
Ireland (EIA) judgment of 19.12.2012; Case C-374/11 Commission v Ireland (Waste Water Treatment Systems) 
judgment 19.12.2012; Case C-533/11 Commission v Belgium (Waste Water Treatment Systems) judgment of 
17.10.2013; Case C-576/11 Commission v Luxembourg (Waste Water Treatment Systems) judgment of 
28.11.2013; Case C-196/13 Commission v Italy (Illegal landfill sites) judgment of 2.12.2014; Case C-378/13 
Commission v Greece (Illegal landfill sites) judgment of 2.12.2014; and Case C-243/13 Commission v Sweden 
(IPPC Directive) judgment of 4.12.2014.All CJEU judgments may be inspected online via the CourtÕs website 
at: http://curia.europa.eu 
21 2161 UNTS 447.  The text of the Convention is accessible on the following UNECE website: www.unece.org 
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levels of compliance with EU environmental law and is the part I wish to focus on principally 
in this paper. The EU has a considerable amount of work yet to do in order to ensure that all 
three components function effectively. The rest of this section will appraise the individual 
components in turn. 
 





2.1  Infringement Procedures (Articles 258/260 TFEU) 
The infringement procedures set out in the EU treaty framework constitute the most well-
established component of the UnionÕs framework for enforcing EU environmental law. Under 
Article 258 TFEU the European Commission has the power to take legal action against 
member states defaulting on their EU obligations, ultimately bringing them before the CJEU 
(known as Ôfirst roundÕ infringement proceedings). If the CJEU finds against the defendant, a 
judicial declaration may be made by the Court confirming non-compliance has occurred. 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, first round proceedings 
have been enhanced to some extent. Specifically, the CJEU has acquired the power to impose 
a penalty payment and/or lump sum not exceeding an amount specified by the Commission 
where the case concerns a failure by the member state to notify the Commission of measures 
to transpose a legislative EU directive into national law by the requisite deadline set by the 
legislative instrument (so-called Ônon-communicationÕ cases).22  In practice penalty payments 
are used where the infraction is ongoing at the time of the judicial ruling, the CJEU 
stipulating a payment to be paid in regular intervals until the breach is remedied. A lump sum 
fine may be imposed as a distinct financial penalty, in practice used in particular to take 
account of the seriousness and impact of a failure to honour EU obligations up until the time 
of the judicial ruling. By virtue of Article 260(1) TFEU member states are required to take 
the necessary measures to comply with the (first round) judgment of the CJEU. Where a 
member state fails to take such steps, under Article 260(2) TFEU the Commission has the 
option of bringing further (second round) legal proceedings against the member state 
concerned, ultimately before the CJEU.  Where it finds that a defendant member state has 
failed to honour its first round judgment, the CJEU may impose a penalty payment and/or 
lump sum fine. Whilst the Commission may and does in practice propose the level of 
financial sanctions,23 the CJEU is not bound by its recommendations.24  
																																																													
22 See Art.260 (3) TFEU. See also Commission Communication   Implementation of Article260 (3) of the Treaty 
(OJ 2011 C12/1) published on 15.1.2011. 
23 The Commission has set out guidance for determining recommended levels of financial penalties in individual 











There is little doubt that the infringement procedures have been and continue to be used by 
the European Commission as key legal tool to hold member states to account for breaches of 
EU environmental law and legislation. Several hundred infringement judgments have been 
handed down over the years since the origins of the EUÕs common environmental policy in 
the 1970s. The author has gleaned from the CJEUÕs case database (InfoCuria25) that over 550 
infringement judgments had been handed down by the Court by the end of 2014 concerning 
breaches of EU environmental law by member states.26 It is also evident that the procedure 
has been given a sharper edge in the wake of successive treaty reform, notably with the 
introduction since 1993 (with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty) of the 
Commission having the possibility of requesting the CJEU to impose financial penalties via 
second round infringement proceedings and more recently since December 2009 (with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) with the introduction of the possibility of financial 
penalties being requested from the CJEU in first round infringement actions involving non-
communication cases as well as a shortening of the administrative pre-litigation procedure for 
second round infringement cases. The new fining powers in relation to non-communication 
cases are particularly relevant to the environmental sector, given that they concern failures to 
transpose EU directives into national law, the core legislative instrument used in the EU 
environmental policy field. 
 
However, for procedural as well as resource-related reasons the impact of the infringement 
procedures on the state of implementation of EU environmental law is set to remain limited. 
Procedurally, the infringement procedure remains a cumbersome legal procedure.  It is 
usually a protracted affair, with first round proceedings taking up to 5 years, and a total of 10 
years required on average before a second round penalty judgment is handed down.27 Overall, 
the level of financial penalties set by the CJEU (in light of Commission recommendations) is 
relatively modest, faring quite unfavourably with the level of fines that may be handed down 
in EU competition cases. For example, a serious long-term nation-wide mismanagement of 
waste in Italy was punished by the CJEU in a December 2014 second round judgment with a 
six monthly penalty payment of €42.8m together with a lump sum of €40m.28  Whilst at first 
glance such sums might appear to be substantial, they pale into insignificance when 
compared with the fines that may be imposed by the Commission in cases of non-compliance 
with EU competition law, where penalties of up to 10% of global turnover of defendants may 
be imposed. For instance, in 2013 a fine of €1.7bn was imposed by the Commission on eight 
multinational banks operating cartels in the financial derivatives sector covering the 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
on 13.12.2005 (OJ 2007 C126) and which may be inspected on the following EU Commission website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_260_en.htm 
24 As confirmed consistently by the CJEU. See most recently at para. 52 of its judgment in Case C-378/13 
Commission v Greece (Illegal landfill sites) judgment of 2.12.2014. 
25 Accessible at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?cid=667272 
26 Specifically, I have identified 552 environmental infringement judgments from the database.  A decade ago, 
Ludwig Krmer calculated that 330 environmental infringement judgments had been handed down as at the end 
of 2005 (see Krmer L, Statistics on environmental judgments by the EC Court of Justice (2006) JEL at 411 
(Table 4)). Accordingly, the CommissionÕs infringement casework continues apace with the number of 
environmental infringement judgments accumulated over the thirty year period between 1976-2005 having 
increased by 60% within just ten years thereafter. 
27 These figures are based on research by the author from the CJEUÕs case reports of its environmental 
infringement judgments. Detailed analysis of the duration of infringement litigation is contained in Ch5 of 
Hedemann-Robinson M, Enforcement of EU Environmental Law: Legal Issues and Challenges 2nd ed. (2015 
Routledge). 
28 Case C-196/13 Commission v Italy (Illegal landfill sites), judgment of 2.12.2014.  
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European Economic Area.29 The levels of fines imposed in infringement cases are not set 
with any degree of precision in terms of assessing the level of environmental and other 
damage that may have been perpetrated as a result of non-compliance. In addition, the 
element of deterrence does not feature strongly amongst the principal factors used for 
calculating individual financial sanctions in (environmental) infringement proceedings. 
Moreover, the CommissionÕs prosecutorial powers are heavily restricted, having no powers to 
hold investigations or impose obligations upon member states (or private operators for that 
matter) found to be at fault.  Such powers have been vested in the Commission since the early 
1960s in relation to breaches of EU competition law.30 
 
 In addition to various procedural constraints posed by the infringement procedures, the 
European Commission is also faced with the problem of limited resources when 
contemplating use of the infringement procedure. On average the CommissionÕs services 
within its Environment Directorate-General provide usually no more than 2 desk officers for 
environmental infringement casework per member state. Accordingly, the Commission can 
only reasonably be expected to take on but a fraction of casework for the EU-28. With the 
adoption of its 2008 Implementation Communication31 (and even before that) it is has been 
evident that the Commission has come to instituted a system of prioritising environmental 
infringement cases which foresees increasing focus being paid to the so-called non-
conformity and non-communication cases, namely cases concerning non-compliance of 
member state laws with EU environmental legislation, and only very serious and endemic 
instances of bad application (namely failures of member states to ensure practical adherence 
to EU environmental norms).32 In the long term this prioritisation framework, which is a 
crystallization of a broader Commission initiative33 to streamline infringement casework 
across EU policy sectors, is likely to mean that the other components of the UnionÕs 
framework on EU environmental law enforcement (discussed in sections 2.2. and 2.3 of this 
article) will be expected to shoulder more of the casework relating to deficient application 
and implementation of EU environmental legislation.  However, this structural realignment of 
the CommissionÕs approach to environmental infringement proceedings will probably take 
some time yet to bed down. Currently, so-called Ôbad applicationÕ infringement cases 
continue to dominate the CommissionÕs caseload, constituting 56% of ongoing environmental 
infringement cases as at the end of 2014.34   
																																																													
29 See the following EU Press Releases: IP/13/1208 and MEMO/13/1090, Brussels, 4 December 2013. 
(Available for inspection at: http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm). 
30 See notably Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L1/1) and Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L24/1). 
31 COM(2008)773 Commission Communication Implementing EC Environmental Law, 18.11.2008. 
32 The 2008 Implementation Communication signals that the Commission is to focus on the following three 
priority areas: (1) non-communication cases; (2) failure to comply with CJEU judgments (second round 
casework); and (3) breaches of EU law, including non-conformity cases, raising issues of principle or having 
particularly far-reaching negative impact for citizens. The latter category would include notably: (a) non-
conformity issues; (b) systemic breaches of environmental quality norms or other requirements presenting 
serious adverse consequences or risks for health or for aspects of nature having high ecological value; (c) 
breaches of core strategic obligations upon which fulfilment of other EU environmental obligations depends; 
and (d) breaches concerning large infrastructure projects or interventions involving EU funding and/or 
significant adverse impacts (COM(2008)773 at section 3.3). 
33 COM(2007) 502, Commission Communication A Europe of Results Ð Applying Community Law, 5.9.2007. 
34Specifically, 189 out of 325 environmental infringement cases being handled as at the end of 2014 by the 
Commission, as reported on its Environment Directorate-GeneralÕs (DG ENV) website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm. Statistical data from the DG ENV site indicate that bad 
application cases have constituted the largest contingent of environmental infringement casework since 2008 





2.2 Enhancement of civil society participation 
Over the last decade or so the EU has taken a range of legislative measures to enhance the 
possibilities for individuals (including NGOs) to be able to participate in ensuring better state 
of implementation of EU environmental law. This process has been underpinned in particular 
by virtue of the EUÕs membership of the 1998 rhus Convention. The Union ratified its 
accession to rhus in 2005,35 a step that is binding on both on the Union as well as member 
states under EU law.36  The Convention essentially requires contracting parties to take 
measures to ensure that citizens are guaranteed rights to access information concerning the 
environment, rights to participate in certain decisions affecting the environment (notably in 
planning approval procedures relating to development projects) as well as rights securing 
effective access to environmental justice. For the purposes of this article, focus will be placed 
on the impact of the access to justice guarantees stipulated by rhus (so-called Ôthird pillarÕ 
of the Convention).  
 
Article 9 of the rhus Convention requires contracting parties to take a number of measures 
to facilitate the possibility of individuals being able to seek administrative and judicial review 
of breaches of their national environmental laws. Specifically, Article 9 stipulates that each 
Party is to ensure that in three types of situations the public should have access to 
independent legal review of decisions, omissions and acts concerning the following areas: 
access to environmental information (Article 9(1)); public participation in certain decisions 
relating to the environment (Article 9(2)) and contraventions of environmental law by public 
authorities or private persons (Article 9(3)). The commitment to access to justice in the 
Convention is supported by some common flanking provisions in Article 9(4)-(5) which 
apply to all three types of review procedure and contain some generally worded requirements 
on the conduct, expense and transparency of procedures.  Article 9(4) stipulates some 
minimum general requirements that must be respected by the relevant administrative or 
judicial review procedures, including notably that each contracting party must provide 
Ôadequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensiveÕ. Article 9(5) obliges the contracting parties 
to ensure that the public is provided with access to information about access to judicial and 
administrative review procedures as well ÔconsiderÕ the establishment of ÔappropriateÕ 
mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to access to justice. 
 
Notwithstanding the UnionÕs accession to the rhus Convention, for two key reasons it is 
reasonable to expect that civil societyÕs role in terms of assisting in improving upon the state 
of compliance with EU environmental legislation is likely to remain relatively limited, albeit 
important.  As discussed below, these reasons concern the limited extent to which the Union 
has implemented its obligations under rhus on access to environmental justice as well as the 
finite resources available to non-governmental environmental organisations.  
 
 
2.2.1 Partial implementation of rhus 
It is true that the EU has adopted a number of instruments intended to implement the access 
to justice obligations contained in rhus, both in relation to the national level of EU member 
																																																													
35 Council Decision 2005/370 on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC, of the Convention on access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (OJ 2005 
L124/1). 
36 See Art.216(2) TFEU. 
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states as well as in relation to the EU institutional level. As far as EU member state level is 
concerned, the Union has adopted provisions securing access to environmental justice in EU 
directives on access to environmental information,37 public participation in certain 
environmental decision-making,38 and environmental liability.39 This article does not intend 
to discuss the individual access to justice provisions of these particular EU instruments, 
which are appraised in detail elsewhere.40 As far as the EU institutional level is concerned, in 
2006 the Union adopted a regulation (Regulation 1376/2006) commonly referred to as the 
Ôrhus RegulationÕ containing some provisions intended to facilitate access to review for 
private individuals of EU decision-making in accordance with the requirements of the rhus 
Convention.41  The access to justice provisions of this EU statutory instrument will be 
considered later below in this section. Notwithstanding the fact that number of EU 
instruments facilitating access to environmental justice have been adopted, it is however 
evident that the Union has only partially implemented rhusÕs third pillar and does not seem 
capable or willing to do so for some time yet.  
 
As far as facilitating access to environmental justice at EU member state level is concerned, 
there remain significant gaps in coverage with no Union access to justice provision, for 
instance, in relation to the areas of water, waste and air quality policy. Whilst the 
Commission proposed a ÔhorizontalÕ directive42 for the implementation of the third pillar of 
rhus in 2003, this legislative initiative access never received sufficient political support 
from the member states in Council in order to become adopted. The proposal was eventually 
quietly withdrawn last May 2014 by the Commission,43 which has yet to come forward 
formally with an alternative legislative proposal.  The silence on the part of the current 
Commission college on this subject jars with recent commitments declared by the Union on 
access to environmental justice. In 2012, the previous Environment Commissioner Jan 
Potočnik made this issue a political priority, declaring that a directive on access to justice in 
environmental matters was ÔindispensableÕ.44 Moreover, the UnionÕs Seventh Environment 
Action Programme (2013-2020)45 promises that under its auspices ÔUnion citizens will have 
access to justice in environmental matters and effective legal protection, in line with the 
rhus Convention and developments brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty and recent case law of the European UnionÕ.46 Specifically, the EAP7 stipulates that it 
																																																													
37 See Art.6 of Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental information (OJ 2003 L41/26). 
38 Originally, the relevant access to justice provisions were contained in Directive 2003/35 providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and 
amending Directives 85/337 and 96/61 (OJ 2003 L156/17) which has been superseded by Art.11 of Directive 
2011/92 on the assessment of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L26/1) and Art. 
25 of the recast Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (OJ 2010 L334/17). 
39See Arts.12-13 of Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability (OJ 2004 L143/56). 
40 See eg. Hedemann-Robinson (2015) op cit FN26 and Wenners, P, The Enforcement of EC Environmental 
Law (2007, Oxford).	
41Regulation 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the rhus Convention to access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters to Community 
institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L264/13) commonly referred to as the ÔǺrhus RegulationÕ. 
42 COM(2003)624 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on access 
to justice in environmental matters, 24.10.2003. 
43 COM(2003)624 was included in the following item in the Official Journal of the EU: Withdrawal of Obsolete 
Commission Proposals (OJ 2014 C153/3). 
44 Speech by Janez Potočnik Ò ÔThe fish cannot go to courtÕ Ðthe environment is a public good that must be 
supported by a public voiceÓ: EU Press Release SPEECH/12/8356 Brussels, 23.11.2012. 
45 Decision 1386/2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ÔLiving well, within the 
limits of our planetÕ (OJ 2013 L354/171). 
46 Para.62, ibid. (This commitment is housed within the EAP7Õs Priority Objective 4: To maximise the benefits 
of Union environment legislation by improving implementation). 
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shall ensure by 2020 that Ôthe principle of effective legal protection for citizens and their 
organisations is facilitatedÕ, requiring in particular Ôthat national provisions on access to 
justice reflect the case law of the Court of Justice of the European UnionÕ. 47 
 
The case law of the CJEU in relation to the area of access to environmental justice at national 
level has had some but ultimately limited impact on assisting in securing adherence to the 
third pillar obligations contained in the rhus Convention. Whilst the Court has recognised 
that EU accession to the Convention is a legally binding commitment on the Union and 
member states under Union law,48 in the Slovakian Brown Bear case49  it rejected arguments 
claiming that the key Convention provision on access to justice (Article 9(3)) has direct 
effect. Accordingly, private individuals may not as a matter of EU rely upon the requirements 
Article 9(3) directly before member state courts. However, the CJEU has acknowledged the 
Convention provision to have indirect effects, in that national courts of the member states are 
required to interpret national law Ôin a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent 
with  the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Convention.50 Such indirect legal effects 
are, though, self-evidently of much weaker enforcement value and essentially dependent 
upon the degree to which national courts are able and willing under national rules of statutory 
interpretation to construe national laws in line with Article 9(3) requirements. Enforceability 
may well become particularly challenging in the face of an unambiguously worded national 
statute in conflict with the terms of rhus.51 On the other hand, the CJEU has taken the 
opportunity to enhance private individualsÕ rights of access to justice before national courts 
when the matter concerns a directly effective EU environmental norm. Specifically, in 
Janecek52 the Court held that the plaintiff had a right as a matter of Union law to seek judicial 
redress before the national courts in order to enforce a directly effective stipulation contained 
in a former EU directive on ambient air quality53 requiring member states to ensure the 
adoption of a plan indicating measures to be taken in the short term where there is a risk of 
EU legislative limit values and/or alert thresholds on air quality being exceeded.  This was so, 
even though the particular EU directive did not provide for any specific minimum 
requirements relating to access to justice at national level. 
  
Efforts to ensure compliance with rhusÕs third pillar at the level of EU decision-making 
have been likewise unsatisfactory.  Opportunities for individuals to challenge the legality of 
EU measures alleged to contravene EU environmental law are overly limited, and have been 
so since the inception of the Union in the 1950s. The root of the problem lies with the very 
strict legal standing (locus standi) requirements contained within the TFEU for private 
persons seeking judicial review. Specifically, barring one relatively minor exception, Article 
263(4) TFEU requires private plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are both directly and 
individually concerned by a disputed EU measure in order to gain access before the General 
Court of the EU in order to plead for an annulment of the act on grounds of the latterÕs 
																																																													
47 See paras. 65(e) and 65(v), ibid. 
48 In accordance with Art.216(2) TFEU. 
49 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranrske zoskupenie VLK (WOLF Forest Protection Movement) v Slovakian 
Environment Ministry [2011] ECR I-1215. 
50 Para.s 50-51 of judgment in Case C-240/09. 
51 This is so, for instance, in the UK where case law on the rules of statutory interpretation would appear to 
exclude the possibility of an international norm being relied upon to distort the meaning of clearly worded 
national legislation. See eg. Garland v British Rail [1983] 2 AC 751; Duke v Reliance Ltd [1988] AC 618.   
52 Case C-237/07 Janecek v Bavaria [2008] ECR I-6211. 
53 Art.7(3) of former Directive 96/62 on ambient air quality assessment (OJ 1996 L296/55) as subsequently 
repealed and superseded by Dir.2008/50 on ambient air quality assessment and management (OJ 2008 L152/1). 
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alleged illegality.54 The requirement of individual concern has meant that legal standing for 
private persons to challenge the legality of EU environmental measures under Article 263 
TFEU is effectively ruled out, given that since the 1960s CJEU has interpreted this to mean 
that the private plaintiff must be affected by the EU measure Ôby reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated 
from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individuallyÕ. 55 
Given that the vast majority of EU environmental measures are designed to impact generally 
upon the public, it is usually impossible for a private person to demonstrate individual 
concern. This has been a long-standing and serious problem experienced those wishing to 
pursue public interest environmental judicial review litigation at EU level, illustrated by cases 
such as Stichting Greenpeace56 and Danielsson57. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced an 
exception in relation to regulatory EU acts, in respect of which private individuals are only 
required to demonstrate they are directly concerned.  However, the impact of this change is 
relatively slight in relation to the environmental sector. Not only does the treaty amendment 
concern but a small fraction of EU environmental instruments, the requirement of direct 
concern is not necessarily straightforward to fulfil in the context of a public interest litigant, 
who may not be considered in a judicial sense directly impacted by the measure. 
 
As is well-known, in 2011 the Compliance Committee of the rhus Convention delivered a 
report notably critical of the strict legal standing requirements for judicial review under EU 
law.58 This was by way of a follow up to a complaint filed to the Committee in December 
2008 by the non-governmental environmental organisation (NGEO) ClientEarth. In its 
(interim) report, the Committee considered that the legal standing requirements of direct and 
individual concern set down in EU law as interpreted by the CJEU conflicted with the 
requirements of Article 9(3) of the rhus Convention. The Committee decided to reserve 
final judgment on the complaint, though, effectively waiting to see what impact certain 
changes pending at the time (namely the Lisbon Treaty 2007 amendments as well the 
introduction of the rhus Regulation) would have on the EU legal order in the light of 
judicial interpretation from the CJEU.   
 
However, it appears that those particular EU statutory developments have not made any 
significant impact on the issue of access to justice at Union institutional level.  Notably, post-
Lisbon the CJEU has confirmed its traditional restrictive stance on legal standing of private 
persons in judicial review cases. Specifically, this occurred in the recent Inuit Tapiirit 
Kanatami litigation.59 This case involved an annulment action brought by a number of natural 
and legal persons in 2010 which challenged the legality of a 2009 EU regulation60 adopted 
jointly by the European Parliament and Council of the EU which imposed restrictions on 
																																																													
54 The specific grounds for seeking an annulment are set out in Art.263(2) TFEU, namely: lack competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the founding EU treaties (TFEU/TEU) or  
of any rule of application relating to their application, or misuse of powers. 
55 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95 (para. 107 of judgment). 
56 Case C-321/95P Stichting Greenpeace et al v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651. 
57 Case T-219/95R Danielsson et al v Commission [1995] ECR II-3051. 
58 Report of the Compliance Committee: Findings and recommendations with regard to communication 
ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the European Union (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1), 
14.4.2011. For a detailed analysis of the Compliance CommitteeÕs report see eg. Marsden S, ÔDirect Public 
Access to EU Courts: Upholding Public International Law via the Aarhus Convention Compliance CommitteeÕ 
(2012) 81 Nordic Jl.of International Law 175. 
59 See judgment of the General Court in Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European 
Parliament and Council [2011] ECR II-5599 and on appeal before the Court of Justice Case C-583/11P Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami and Others, judgment of 3.10.2013.  
60 Regulation 1007/09 (OJ 2009 L216/1). 
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trade in seal products within the EU. Specifically, the regulation only permitted the placing 
on the single market of seal products resulting from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit 
and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence. Both the European 
Parliament and Council, supported by the Commission, claimed the legal action should be 
ruled inadmissible on grounds that the private plaintiffs lacked the requisite legal standing, 
specifically that none of them were individually concerned by the EU regulation. The 
litigation ultimately came before the CJEU on appeal in 2013, the General Court having 
dismissed the action in 2011 for want of legal standing on the part of the plaintiffs.61 The 
CJEU62 agreed with the General Court, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the 
requirements of individual concern as the contested Union regulation, adopted by way of 
legislative procedure, was generally worded and applied indiscriminately to any seal product 
trader falling within its scope.63 The CJEU was unconvinced that the member states had 
intended to alter the legal position on legal standing through the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Recent case law of the CJEU 64 has also served to restrict the impact of the access to review 
provisions contained within the rhus Regulation. By virtue of Article 10(1) of the rhus 
Regulation, a NGEO meeting certain criteria65 is entitled to request a Union institution or 
body, which it considers has adopted an administrative act or failed to adopt such an act 
contrary to EU environmental law, to undergo an internal review of its conduct. 
Administrative acts are defined in the rhus Regulation as being limited to any measure of 
Ôindividual scopeÕ.66 The litigation in question concerned the requests from two NGEOs to 
the European Commission for the latter to undertake an internal review of certain EU 
measures, one being a Commission decision to give the Netherlands more time to comply 
with EU air pollution requirements concerning nitrogen oxides (NOx), the other concerning 
an EU regulation stipulating certain maximum pesticide levels in food. The Commission 
refused to undertake a review of either measure, on the grounds that they did not concern the 
plaintiffs individually as required by the terms of the rhus Regulation. Both NGEOs 
brought annulment proceedings before the General Court of the EU in respect of the 
CommissionÕs decision to refuse to conduct an internal review, claiming that this amounted 
to a contravention of Article 9(3) of the rhus Convention. Article 9(3) stipulates in essence 
that contracting parties grant members of the public access to administrative or judicial 
procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities67 which 
contravene provisions of the environmental law of the contracting party. 
The General Court issued its judgments in 2012,68 finding in favour of the plaintiffs. It 
annulled the CommissionÕs decisions to refuse to undertake a review, holding that the 
requirement of individual scope under Article 10(1) of the rhus Regulation contravened the 
requirements contained in Article 9(3) of the rhus Convention, as ratified by the Union. 
																																																													
61 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, op cit. FN58.  
62 Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others, op cit. FN58. 
63 Para.73 of judgment, ibid. 
64 Judgments of the General Court in Case T-396/09 VerenigingMilieudefensie, Stichting Stop 
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission, judgment 14.6.2012 and in Case T-338/08 Stichting en Milieu & 
Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission together with the judgment of the Court of justice of the EU on 
appeal in Joined Cases Case C-401-403/12P Council, EP and Commission v Vereniging Milieudefensie and 
Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, judgment of 13.1.2015 (available for inspection on CJEUÕs curia 
website: www.curia.eu). 
65 As set out in Art.11 of the rhus Regulation 1367/06 op cit FN40. 
66 Art.2(1)(g) ibid.	
67 ÔPublic authorityÕ is defined in Art.2(2)(d) of the Ǻrhus Convention as including the institutions of any 
regional economic organisation party to the international agreement. 
68 Judgments of the General Court in Case T-396/09 and Case C-338/08 op cit FN63. 
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However, on 13 January 2015 the General CourtÕs decision was overruled by the CJEU on 
appeal. The CJEU held that the EUÕs ratification of the rhus Convention did not lead in this 
instance to the vitiation of Article 10(1) of the rhus Regulation. The CJEU noted that it was 
already established in its jurisprudence that Article 9(3) of the Convention did not have direct 
effects within the EU legal order. Moreover, whilst the CJEU conceded that it had held 
previously in certain cases69 that that EU secondary legislation adopted to implement an 
international agreement should be construed in the light of the rules of the international 
agreement, in this particular instance that strict review approach was not warranted given that 
notably Article 10(1) of the rhus Regulation does not make specific reference to the 
Convention, confer a specific Convention right on individuals nor does it implement specific 
detailed obligations contained in an international agreement. The CJEU noted with regard to 
the latter point that Article 9(3) of the Convention gives contracting parties broad discretion 
in determining the rules concerning administrative or judicial procedures.  
As a result of the CJEUÕs judgment it would appear that opportunities for members of the 
public to seek review of EU acts adopted in contravention of Union law, already very 
restricted, have been curtailed yet further. Unless a person is able to demonstrate that they are 
individually affected by the contested act, it appears from the CJEU appeal ruling that they 
have no standing under the rhus Regulation to require the decision-making body of the EU 
to undertake an internal review of its measure. This latest EU judicial ruling would appear to 
set the Union on collision course with the rhus ConventionÕs Compliance Committee, 
which is set to complete its appraisal of the ClientEarth complaint to it of EU rules on access 
to environmental justice at some point. However, even if the Compliance Committee were to 
declare the EU in non-compliance with third pillar obligations of the rhus Convention, it is 
questionable what impact such a finding might have. As Macrory points out, the Committee 
does not have any specific sanctioning powers.70 Under the Convention, the Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP) may decide on appropriate measures to bring about compliance, including the 
provision of advice and assistance and/or the adoption of recommendations.71 In sum, the 
enforcement tools at the disposal of the rhus authorities are relatively soft, namely adverse 
publicity as well as possible pressure exerted by contracting parties. In addition, findings and 
recommendations from the Compliance Committee or MOP have, formally speaking, no 
legal force within the EU legal order. Accordingly, unless the EU member states decide to 
make further treaty changes to Article 263 TFEU or the CJEU elects unilaterally to change its 
interpretation of the treaty articleÕs locus standi provisions, neither of which appears likely to 
occur, the EUÕs legal position on access to justice in respect of Union level decisions is set to 
remain in its current restrictive state. 
 
2.2.2 Resource factors 
Over and above the implementation difficulties experienced by the EU in relation to rhusÕs 
third pillar, it is important to take account also of the ultimately finite impact that civil society 
participation can bring to bear on the issue of non-compliance.  Significant resource 
challenges and limitations confront private individuals and organisations seeking to take up a 
law enforcement role of a financial, legal and technical nature that should not be 
underestimated.  Financial limitations include, in particular, factors such as legal costs72 and 
																																																													
69 Such as CJEU judgments in Case 70/87 Fediol [1989] ECR 1781 and Case C-69/89 Nakajima [1991] ECR 
2069. 
70 Macrory R, European Court backs down on Aarhus ruling ENDS Report (March 2015) Issue 481 at p24. 
71 Decision I/7 Review of Compliance adopted by the Meeting of the Parties, Lucca, Italy (2002). 
72 One example of this problem is the issue of cross-undertaking in damages in the context of judicial review 
proceedings in England and Wales. Where an applicant seeks an interim injunction preventing further action 
pending final judgment, they are required to provide an undertaking in damages covering any loss of profits to 
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limited staff resources available to be allocated to assist with enforcement litigation. Legal 
barriers include notably a lack of investigatory powers for private persons for the purpose of 
securing evidence of breaches of law. Technical limits include difficulties in overcoming 
scientific knowledge barriers and equipment challenges for the purpose of gleaning sufficient 
evidence to underpin legal action. These factors may serve as significant constraints as to the 




2.3 Competent authorities and law enforcement 
The third component of the UnionÕs framework on enforcement of EU environmental law, 
namely that relating to the role of competent authorities, constitutes arguably the most 
important aspect of the UnionÕs effort in enhancing the state of implementation of EU 
environmental law. The role of competent authorities, specifically public authorities charged 
with responsibility for overseeing the correct implementation of environmental law at EU 
member state level, cannot be underestimated. They play a crucial part in law enforcement, 
particularly in deterring, detecting and rectifying breaches of environmental law as well as 
holding perpetrators to account. They are invariably vested with substantially greater powers 
and resources than either the European Commission or civil society for the purposes of 
overseeing compliance.  However, studies over the years (such as those carried out or 
sponsored by either European Commission or the IMPEL network74), have noted that the 
quality and effectiveness of national competent authorities varies greatly in the environmental 
sector. Undoubtedly weaknesses in competent authority structures, strategy and resourcing 
have served to undermine efforts to ensure that EU environmental obligations are complied 
with on the ground.  
 
From its inception the EU has always had an expressly recognised interest and responsibility 
for ensuring that member states take requisite measures to ensure proper application of Union 
law. This is underscored by the so-called Ôgood faithÕ clause enshrined within the EU treaty 
framework contained in Article 4(3) TEU, which places a general legal duty on member 
states to take active steps to ensure adhere to EU obligations as well as engage in sincere co-
operation with the Union for this purpose.75 The CJEU has held that a number of implicit 
obligations incumbent on member states (including their competent authorities) relevant to 
law enforcement flow from Article 4(3) including: the duty to proceed with same degree of 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
be forfeited in the event of the applicant losing the case. This may involve a considerable sum, in particular if 
the case concerns a dispute over proposed major development projects. This can effectively price NGEOs out of 
this type of remedy as exemplified in the litigation over the development of thermal oxide nuclear processing at 
Sellafield as well as a port development on Lappel Bank mudflats in Sheerness (see R V HMIP ex parte 
Greenpeace [1994]  1 WLR 570 and Case C-44/95 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte RSPB 
(Lappel Bank) [1996] ECR I-3805).  
73 For an analysis of key challenges confronting private entities considering engaging in public interest 
environmental litigants, see eg. Ch10 of Bell S/McGillivray D/Pedersen O, Environmental Law 8th ed (2013 
Oxford) at pp336-353.  
74 See eg. the 2011 COWI and 2015 IMPEL reports on implementation of EU environmental law cited in FN13-
14. 
75 Art.4(3) TEU states:  
 ÒPursuant to the principle of sincere co-operation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
 mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
 The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular,  to ensure fulfilment of 
 the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of institutions of the Union. 
 The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the UnionÕs tasks and refrain from any measure 
 which could jeopardise the attainment of the UnionÕs objectives.Ó 
16	
	
vigilance in detecting breaches of EU law as with national law76; the duty to ensure that EU 
infringements are penalised with effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions77; and the 
duty of due diligence to review decision-making so as to ensure conformity with EU law.78  
For many years, though, the question of EU involvement in setting minimum requirements 
for national competent authorities in the environmental sector remained extremely politically 
sensitive to the member states. The introduction of the subsidiarity principle within the EU 
treaty framework in the 1990s by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty, currently enshrined in 
Article 5(3) TEU,79 underpinned several member states assumptions that the organisation of 
competent authority structures and operations should be considered to remain an essentially 
national preserve. 
 
By the early 2000s, however, the political climate had evolved sufficiently so as to allow the 
Union to begin to develop an emerging legal framework providing for certain minimum 
requirements for competent authorities regarding enforcement of EU environmental law, both 
in relation to the aspect of sanctions in respect of non-compliance as well as in the field of 
environmental inspections. With respect to the issue of sanctions, two EU legislative 
instruments stand out in this regard, namely the 2004 EU Environmental Liability Directive 
(ELD)80 and the 2008 EU Environmental Crimes Directive (ECD).81  The ELD obliges 
member states to ensure that their national competent authorities take steps to hold operators 
account for instances of significant environmental damage and oversee remediation of 
damaged sites. The ECD obliges member states to penalise serious breaches of EU 
environmental law through the use of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
sanctions. Both the ELD and ECD have been subject to substantial discussion elsewhere82 
and, for reasons of space, will not be considered in any detail for the purposes of this paper.  
 
As far as the area of environmental inspections is concerned the EU has also passed a range 
of general and specific measures stipulating minimum requirements for competent 
authorities. The EUÕs involvement and increasing interest in the area of environmental 
inspections is both relatively recent and still emerging. There have been long-standing 
concerns about the effectiveness of a number of environmental inspectorate systems in 
several member states. Varies studies (such as those sponsored by the European 
																																																													
76 See eg. Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965 (esp. paras.23-24 of judgment). 
77 See eg. Case C-354/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I-7657 (at para. of 46 judgment).  
78 Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedriff P K Kraaijeveld BV [1996] ECR I-5403. 
79 Art.5(3) TEU stipulates: 
 ÒUnder the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
 Union shall act only if and in so far as  the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
 achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
 reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 
 The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on 
 the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National parliaments ensure 
 compliance with principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.Ó 
80 Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental 
damage (OJ 2004 L143/56). 
81 Directive 2008/99on the protection of the environment through criminal law (OJ 2008 L328/28). 
82 On the ELD see for example: Ch12 of Hedemann-Robinson (2015), op cit FN26; Betlem, G/Brans, E, (eds) 
Environmental Liability in the EU: The 2004 Directive compared with US and Member State Law (2008, 
London, Cameron May); Wilde, M, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage: Comparative Analysis of Law 
and Policy in Europe and the US 2nd edn (2013, Wolters Kluwer). On the ECD see for example: Ch13 of 
Hedemann-Robinson (2015), op cit FN26; Cardwell, P/ French, D/Hall, M, ÔTackling Environmental Crime in 
the EU: The Case of the Missing Victim?Õ (2011) 1 Env Liability 35; Hedemann-Robinson, M, ÔThe Emergence 
of European Union Environmental Criminal Law: A Quest for Solid Foundations: Parts I and IIÕ (2008) 16(3) 
Environmental  Liability 71 and 16(4) Environmental Liability 111. 	
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Commission83 or by undertaken by IMPEL84) have revealed and/or confirmed widely 
differing types and quality of environmental inspection systems across member states. 
Differences are often marked in terms of resourcing, number of agencies involved as well as 
supervision strategies employed (eg. quantitative /qualitative, deterrence-based/educative-
based). Environmental inspection is obviously a key element in the law enforcement toolbox, 
not least given its preventative dimension in assisting in efforts to minimise instances of non-
compliance arising.  
 
Owing to political resistance and sensitivities on the part of several EU member states, EU 
engagement in the subject of inspections had proceeded rather tentatively for a number of 
years. However, subsequent to a 1996 Commission proposal 85 that common guidelines be 
developed for national inspectorate systems, in a 1997 resolution86 the Council of the EU 
invited the Commission to draft guidelines on the basis of work carried out by IMPEL. This 
engagement ultimately culminated in 2001 with the adoption of a non-binding instrument on 
national environmental inspection systems, namely Recommendation 2001/33187 providing 
for min criteria for environmental inspections (RMCEI)  under the aegis of the UnionÕs Sixth 
Environment Action Programme88 (EAP6) (2001-2012). Still in force, the aim of the RMCEI 
is to improve the level of effectiveness of member state inspectorate systems for both 
environmental protection reasons as well as reasons concerned with distortion of 
competition89 within the single market. The personal scope of the RMCEI is limited to 
covering installations whose air emissions, water discharges and/or waste disposal or 
recovery activities are subject to authorisation, permit or licensing requirements under EU 
law. 90 Essentially, this concerns installations subject to integrated pollution prevention and 
control requirements, now regulated primarily by the Industrial Emissions Directive 
2010/75.91 The recommendation stipulates that member states should observe a range of 
minimum criteria regarding the planning of inspections,92 organisation of routine and non-
routine site visits,93 investigations into suspected serious breaches,94  as well as filing reports 
on and evaluating next steps with respect to site visits.95 In essence, the RMCEI constituted 
																																																													
83 See eg. COWI/ECORYS/CE Impact assessment study into possible options for revising Recommendation 
2001/331 providing for minimum criteria for environmental inspections - Final Report for the European 
Commission (2011) (ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073); IEEP/BIOIS/ECOLOGIC, Study on inspection requirements 
for waste shipments Ð Final Report for the European Commission (ENV G.4/FRA/2007/0067). 
84 See eg. 2003 report of the IMPEL Secretariat ÔShort overview of the organisation of inspection in the EU 
member states, Norway and acceding and candidate countriesÕ. See also IMPEL reports on inspections 
regarding waste shipments: Seaport Projects I-II (2003-6), Verification of Waste Destinations Projects I (2003-
6) and Enforcement Actions Projects I-III (2008-12). An overview is provided for on the IMPEL website at: 
http://impel.eu/cluster-2/   
85 COM(96)500 Commission Communication Implementing Community Environmental Law, 22.10.1996.  
86 Council Resolution of 7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation and enforcement of Community 
environmental law (OJ 1997 C321/1). 
87 Recommendation 2001/331 providing for minimum criteria of environmental inspections in the member states 
(OJ 2001 L118/41). 
88 Decision 1600/2002 (OJ 2002 L242/1). 
89 Namely, to ensure that market operators are subject to commensurate levels of scrutiny and accompanying 
costs for the purpose of EU environmental law compliance irrespective of their location within the Union. 
90 Paragraph II(1)(a) RMCEI. 
91  Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) (OJ 2010 
L334/17) which has succeeded the earlier IPPC legislation, namely former IPPC Directive 96/61 (OJ 1996 
L257/26) as consolidated by Directive 2008/1 (OJ 2008 L24/8). 
92 Paragraph IV RMCEI. 
93 Paragraph V RMCEI.	
94 Paragraph VII RMCEI.	
95 Paragraph VI RMCEI. 
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an important milestone for EU policy on environmental inspections, in establishing some 
core benchmarks for national inspectorate systems.  
 
In 2007 the Commission undertook a review96 of the effectiveness of the RMCEI and a 
number of significant shortcomings were identified. Several member states had failed to 
implement its requirements by the 2002 deadline set in the instrument.97 The Commission 
reported that implementation of the instrument was unclear or partially complete in most 
member states, with only five countries98 assessed as having reached a high levelÕ of 
implementation.99 The Commission also found that the RMCEI had been interpreted 
differently between member states so as create disparities over the types of installations 
covered and also that the material scope of the instrument was too narrow, excluding a range 
of activities and sectors with significant impacts on the environment subject to EU legislation 
(such as waste shipments, protected habitat sites, wildlife trafficking and chemical and 
hazardous substance use). Moreover, various terms in the RMCEI had been interpreted 
differently by member states with significant consequences for implementation.  The 
Commission initially decided to aim for a revision of the Recommendation (thereby rejecting 
use of a legally binding measure) coupled with steps to introduce targeted binding minimum 
inspection standards through sectoral legislation. 
 
In parallel with initially tentative steps to revise the RMCEI, the EU has first gradually, then 
steadily, built up a range of sectoral legislative provision in relation to minimum standards on 
environmental inspections carried out by national competent authorities.  The following 
environmental sectors now contain certain minimum inspection obligations under EU 
legislation: industrial emissions,100 major accident hazards involving dangerous substances,101 
waste management,102 ozone depleting substance management,103 geological storage of 
carbon,104 scientific experimentation on animals,105 the civil nuclear industry106 as well as the 
common fisheries policy (CFP).107 The EU legislative provisions on environmental 
inspections vary in terms of detail and stringency. This is partly as a tailoring according to the 
perceived requirements for an individual sector and partly as a result of when individual 
legislative instruments were adopted. The pursuit of a Ôsectoral trackÕ approach to inspection 
regulation has been followed for essentially pragmatic reasons. Particular environmental 
																																																													
96 SEC(2007)1493 Commission Report on implementation of Recommendation 2001/331 providing for minimum 
criteria for environmental inspections, 14.11.2007.  
97
	Paragraph X RMCEI.	
98 Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
99 See p 20 of SEC(2007)1493 op cit. FN95. 
100 Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) (OJ 2010 
L334/17). 
101 Directive 2012/18 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and 
subsequently repealing Directive 96/82 (OJ 2012 L197/1) (ÔSeveso IIIÕ). 
102 Directive 2008/98 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L312/3), Directive 1999/31 on the 
landfill of waste (OJ 1999 L182/1),  Directive 2006/21 on the management of waste from extractive industries 
and amending Directive 2004/35 (OJ 2006 L102/15),  Directive 2012/19 on waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE) (recast) (OJ 2012 L197/38)  and Regulation 660/2014 amending Regulation 1013/2006 on 
shipments of waste (OJ 2014 L189/135). 
103 Regulation 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (recast) (OJ 2009 L286/1). 
104 Directive 2009/31 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending various Directives (OJ 2009 
L140/114). 
105Directive 2010/63 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes (OJ 2010 L276/33).  
106Art.35 EAEC (Euratom Treaty).  
107 Regulation 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation 2847/93 
(OJ 2005 L347) in conjunction with Regulation 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for 
ensuring compliance with the rules of the CFP (OJ 2009 L343). 
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sectors have been prioritised for EU legislative attention according to the perceived level of 
environmental risk of activities and/or overall record amongst member states on 
implementation. This approach has led to a great variation in terms of range, specificity and 
intensity of inspection obligation across sectors, sometimes difficult to justify.   
 
With the adoption of its Seventh Environment Action Programme (EAP7) (2013-2020)108 the 
EUÕs position on the issue of environmental inspections has become more ambitious.109 
Notably, an express commitment has been enshrined within EAP7 Priority Objective 4110 con 
developing legally binding instrumentation on minimum inspection standards as well as the 
promotion of support capacity at EU level. Specifically, the material provision regarding the 
development of existing EU policy regarding inspections and surveillance is paragraph 65(iii) 
of the Annex to the Decision adopting the EAP7, which stipulates that the UnionÕs 
environment policy programme requires:  
  
 Ôextending binding criteria for effective Member State inspections and surveillance to 
 the wider body of Union environmental law, and further developing inspection 
 support capacity at Union level, drawing on existing structures, backed up by 
 support for networks of professionals such as IMPEL, and by the reinforcement of 
 peer reviews and best practice sharing, with a view to increasing the efficiency and 
 effectiveness of inspectionsÕ. 
 
This provision within EAP7 has accordingly signalled the UnionÕs commitment to the 
development of two principal dimensions of future EU engagement in the area of 
environmental inspections. Specifically, it has promised not only intervention to enhance the 
inspection systems of national competent authorities but also complementary development of 
EU supranational institutional inspection capability.  To date, though, the Commission has 
only begun to focus on the first of the two dimensions, namely at the level of national 
inspectorates. Following on from a 2011 impact assessment study considering options for 
revision to the RMCEI111 as well as a stakeholder consultation which delivered strong 
support for strengthening the existing EU legal framework,112 the CommissionÕs 
Environment Directorate-General (DG ENV)  has signalled its view in favour of 
recommending a horizontal framework directive be proposed to promote coherence to the 
existing state of EU legislation on environmental inspections.113 The initiative would 
accordingly be intended to be legally binding, in contrast to the RMCEI and would cover the 
																																																													
108 Decision 1386/2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 -  Living well, within the 
limits of our planet (OJ 2013 L354/171).  
109 This assurance followed up an earlier 2012 Commission Communication  concerning enhancing 
implementation of Union environmental measures (COM(2012)95), in which the Commission signalled its 
intention to push for a broadening out and upgrading of the existing EU legislative framework on inspections 
and surveillance. 
110 Priority Objective 4 (To maximise the benefits of Union environmental legislation by improving 
implementation) within Dec.1386/2013, op cit. FN116. 
111
	COWI/ECORYS/CE Impact assessment study into possible options for revising Recommendation 2001/331 
providing for minimum criteria for environmental inspections - Final Report for the European Commission 
(2011) (ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073). Available for inspection on the CommissionÕs DG ENV website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm	
112 The details of the stakeholder consultation process and findings are available for inspection on the 
CommissionÕs DG ENV website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm	
113 These observations are based upon an Outline Paper and Explanatory Paper presented by the European 
CommissionÕs DG ENV at a joint workshop between the Commission and IMPEL in Rome in December 2014. 




broad span of EU existing environmental legislation. The draft legislative initiative would be 
based on a compliance assurance approach, which would entail member states utilising the 
tool of risk assessment for the purposes of identifying strategically principal non-compliance 
problems, before applying various risk mitigation techniques (compliance promotion, 
monitoring and enforcement) in order to enhance levels of adherence to EU environmental 
legislation.  However, it may be some time yet before the Commission feels ready to approve 
the launch of a formal draft initiative.   Notably, it is not clear when (or indeed if) the current 
Commission college will be receptive to the adoption of a formal legislative proposal for a 
directive.   The issue of enhancing of implementation of EU environmental law, including the 
prescient issues environmental inspections and access to environmental justice identified in 
EAP7, does not feature amongst list of priorities identified in the European Commission 
PresidentÕs mission letter114 of November 2014 to Karmenu Vella, Commissioner for 
Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, for the current CommissionÕs five year tenure 
to 2020. The new administrative structuring within the Commission organised by the 
President means that, in order for any new initiative to be (potentially) included within the 
CommissionÕs work programme,115 this has to be first recommended by one of the 
Commission Vice Presidents on the basis that it is deemed to fit within the Political 
Guidelines document, presented by the Commission President to the European Parliament in 
July 2014.116 Given that environmental policy, other than in respect to climate change, barely 
features in the Political Guidelines,117 it may well prove in practice a tough task for the 
Environment Directorate-General to persuade the Commission hierarchy to adopt a 




III Concluding remarks 
 
Without doubt, in certain respects the European Union has travelled some distance in terms 
of developing its framework for overseeing the due application of its rules on environmental 
protection. It is no longer accurate to depict the Union relying solely upon the infringement 
procedure as a legal enforcement tool. For the EUÕs accession to the rhus Convention as 
well as its support for national authority networking initiatives such as IMPEL have led to the 
development of additional Union-level mechanisms intended to underpin EU environmental 
law enforcement, specifically in relation to the promotion of enhanced access to 
environmental justice for individuals as well in relation to improved standards and controls 
concerning environmental inspections.  Moreover, the infringement procedure itself has been 
subject to some relatively recent improvements by virtue of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which 
have, to some extent at least, sharpened up its deterrent edge.  Notably, this includes the 
																																																													
114 See FN7. 
115 The CommissionÕs Work Programme for 2015 is set out in COM(2014)910 Commission Communication 
Commission Work Programme 2015 Ð A New Start, 16.12.2014. Available for inspection at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-documents/index_en.htm. 
116 Juncker J-C, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change: 
Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (July 2014). Available for inspection at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf 
117 The Political Guidelines identify 10 priority policy areas for the Commission college appointed for the period 
2015-2020, which in broad terms may be highlighted as: jobs, growth and investment; digitalisation of the 
single market; energy union in conjunction with climate change policy; strengthening of internal market; 
deepening of economic  and monetary union; attainment of a free trade agreement with the US; deepening the 
area of justice in conjunction with fundamental rights; development of a new migration policy; strengthening of 
Union external relations and strengthening of democratic structures of EU decision-making. 
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introduction of the possibility of fines being imposed in first round proceedings concerning 
non-transposition cases. 
 
Nevertheless, the Union has a considerable way to go yet before it may be in a position to 
claim seriously that it has established a legal framework suitable to ensure effective 
supervision of the proper implementation and enforcement of EU environmental protection 
rules.  Notably, significant gaps exist in terms of securing access to environmental justice  
and the UnionÕs intervention in the area of inspections is still at a relatively early stage with 
relatively weak and/or patchy legal support structures. Moreover, in recent years the 
Commission has reigned in considerably its role in intervening in suspected cases of  
misapplication of EU environmental legislation through infringement proceedings. Until 
there are significant improvements made to the existing EU legal framework on 
environmental law enforcement, it is most likely to remain, in contrast to the current 
Commission PresidentÕs assessment, underdeveloped, incomplete as well as immature. And 
that is important in terms of having a bearing on the state of implementation of EU 
environmental legislation across the member states. 
 
